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COMMENTS ON INTE RNATIoNAL LAW AND EcoNomIc DEVELOPMENT
By A. A. FATOuBos
Indiana University School of Law
I shall start by stressing a point which may be related to one of Mr.
Feliciano's observations. One difficulty in considering the topic of international law and economic development is that there is really flo such
thing as international development; there is only the development of the
underdeveloped countries. The adjective "international" adds a certain
dimension to the problem, by indicating that it is a matter for international concern. But the basic process remains a "national" one-one
which has to occur inside states. In the terms of political scientists (and
I do not claim to be one), international law moves on a systemic level of
analysis while development occurs on a sub-systemic level. There is thus
no exact correspondence between international law concepts or processes
and national ones. If "aid" is the international concept, "development"
is not its national equivalent.
We know too little about the influence of law on the economic or social
developments which occur inside a national state. We know even less
about the actual or potential r6le of international law. The present situation in many developing states challenges the basic assumptions about
the legal, economic and political structures of states members of the international society which were made, rightfully and as a matter of course,
in traditional international law. This situation arises on the political
level as well, but it is even more compelling a challenge in the case of
economic development. In considering its problems, not only political
ideology, but also political instability, social structure, even cultural and
religious features, are of essential significance. We have to inquire into
their effects. I take it that it is to considerations of this sort that Professor Lasswell refers in his list of questions concerning the participants
in the aid process. The questions which arise concern more specifically the
recipient states and relate to the identity and legitimacy of their officials,
the ultimate binding effect of commitments made by them, the officials'
perception of their own nations and of the international environment, etc.
It is with acute awareness of these vast areas of inadequate knowledge
or theory that I should like to proceed to comment further on some of the
questions raised in the papers by Professor Lasswell and Professor Friedmann. I should like to inquire more precisely into the manner in which
the developing principles and institutions of modern international law are
affecting or are going to affect the process of social and economic development in the less developed countries.
Take the "principle of capability." The identification of this principle
or, better, the convergence of views as to its existence and validity (for
both speakers agree on that) is a most important step in bringing international law to bear upon the development process. I take it that no one
asserts that this is an actual, firmly established legal principle. In fact,

it is far from being so. What we have at present is but an indication of a
possible direction in which the international society appears to be moving,
a direction in which many steps have been taken but where a final stage, or
even a plateau, has not yet been reached.
The central question is, what kinds of relations and transactions would
come under this principle and how would they be affected by its existence?
Professor Lasswell has given us some indications as to this, and I would
like to pursue the point a little further.
One major difficulty is that the international order is an "horizontal"
system of relations, and therefore international transactions are bilateral
and multilateral arrangements between participants which offer the appearance of contractual transactions as we know them from municipal law.
Here, as elsewhere, appearances are often deceiving as well as confusing.
The problem may become clearer if we consider that in municipal law the
principle of capability is implemented, as it is in the modern welfare state,
through legislation and not by means of contractual arrangements. Its
implementation is rightfully considered not as a private but as a political
matter, and politics have been recently described as referring to the process
whereby a result is reached when there is no universal agreement about it.
Now, international economic assistance is the most typical of the transactions which come under the principle of capability. Is it the only one?
Professor Lasswell's reference to private foreign investment would suggest
that it is not. The question arises, how does private foreign investment
come under this principle? Professor Lasswell's paper is not very clear
at this point; he appears to insist on the traditional conditions to "attract"
investments: "fair return on capital," "capital security." Are then all
business transactions, all transfers of resources, when they involve developing countries, to be held as coming under the principle of capability?
But then what difference does the principle make?
Let us look at the actual content of this principle. It seems to me that
the core of the principle is the abandonment of formal reciprocity and
immediate mutuality as a chief test of the "fairness" of the international
transactions. When the contribution of one party to the transaction is
not the equivalent, by market criteria, of that of the other, then the
principle of capability comes into play. However, the elimination of the
,market test of immediate and reciprocal advantage does not imply a disregard of the interests of one of the parties. Professor Lasswell provides
the answer to this in his very definition of the principle: "given the common interest in value optimalization on a world-wide scale." It is the
common, long-run, interest of the world community (and, contrary to Mr.
Feliciano, I would insist on the long-term character of this interest), an
interest which includes the interest of the developed countries, that eventually balances out the transaction.
I agree with Professor Lasswell that the development process should be
understood as continuing indefinitely and not as being concluded when all
nations reach some ideal state of equal development. For this reason I

cannot agree with his suggestion, if I understand it correctly, that at some
future stage the unbalanced transactions, under the capability principle,
will be transformed into "normal" market relations, and that presumably
the principle will wither away. As long as differential rates and stages
of development exist, the principle of capability continues to be necessary.
The application of the principle is rather evident in the case of foreign
aid, but it obtains as well in other fields; for instance, in international
trade, where the recent claims of the developing nations may be seen as
being aimed at the implementation of the principle.
On another issue I should like again to express agreement with Mr.
Feliciano and to stress a point which, if I understand him correctly, is
substantially the same with one he made. Does application of the principle of capability mean that the aid recipients or, more generally, the
developing countries which benefit from its operation, have no obligations ?
I do not think so. The recipient's basic obligation is to utilize the resources transferred to it, in good faith and with the maximum efficiency
possible under the circumstances, for its economic development; perhaps
even to use them in the manner most conducive to the development of other
countries and, more generally, in conformity with the common interests
of the international society.
I know I am in trouble here and what I am saying would probably be
rejected outright by most spokesmen for the developing countries. I am
suggesting that a traditionally "domestic" question, that of economic and
social development, has become a matter of international concern. What
about national sovereignty ? But I find this conclusion necessary and unavoidable. If there is an international public policy, binding on the developed nations, in favor of assisting economic development, then there
must be a public policy in favor of promoting their own (and the international) development -which is binding on the developing countries. I
am not suggesting that the final judgment as to the carrying out of this
obligation should be left merely to the donors or creditors, but I do not
see how it can be left to the uncontrolled discretion of the recipients;
conversely, I do not believe that the decision as to the granting or quantum
of assistance can be made only by the recipients or only by the donors.
Methods for internationalizing the decisions and for policing the obligations must be found.
Professor Lasswell's repeated insistence on the necessity of third-party
adjudication is quite appropriate here, but only if understood as referring
to the creation and acceptance of channels for communication, decisionmaking and review rather than to the determination of the identity of
specific individual decision-makers of a judicial or semi-judicial character,
as his reference to "tribunals" might indicate.
Here, then, is where international institutions will have to come in.
However, I do not share Professor Friedmann's even qualified optimism and
I am not at all convinced of the present ability of the existing organizations
to cope with this problem and to control effectively the carrying out of
the related obligations on both sides. Perhaps the methods currently ex-

